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Available online 11 June 2014AbstractMany researchers have shown that differences in legal origin explain differences in financial development. Using historical comparisons and
cross-country regressions for 30 countries observed for the period from 2005 to 2010, this study tried to assess if different legal origins impacted
on the development of Islamic finance. More particularly, this paper tried to assess empirically why and how Shari'a Law's legal origins adopted
wholly or partially (combined with Common or Civil Law) could explain the level of development of Islamic finance in different jurisdictions.
Firstly, we found that countries adopting a Shari'a legal system had a very well developed Islamic financial system. Secondly, we found that
countries, adopting a mixed legal system based on Common Law and Shari'a Law, were characterized by the flexibility of their legal systems to
make changes to their laws in response to the changing socioeconomic conditions and that these helped the development of the Islamic financial
industry. However, we found that countries, adopting a mixed legal system based on both Civil Law and Shari'a Law, were less flexible in making
changes to their old laws and this thwarted the development of the Islamic financial industry in these countries. Thirdly, we found that the
concentration of Muslim population (the percentage of Muslim population) had a positive effect on the development of the Islamic banking
system. Also, the level of income had a positive and significant effect on the development of Islamic banking.
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Over the last decade, the emergence of a considerably body
of research on law and finance suggested that cross-country
differences in legal origins could explain cross-country dif-
ferences in financial development. One of the important fac-
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new socioeconomic circumstances (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, &
Levine, 2003). The law's flexibility emphasized the formalism
of laws and the ability of legal traditions to change. Particu-
larly, legal systems, which adapt their effectiveness to the
contracting needs of the economy, promote the development
of the financial system. Whilst considerable research exam-
ined the effect of the legal system on financial development by
concentrating on the effect of the origins of Civil and Common
Law, few pieces of research attempted to study the effects of
the legal system and especially Shari'a Law on the develop-
ment of the Islamic financial system. Even if these researchesting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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research had attempted to test empirically the Theory of Law
and Finance in the context of Islamic finance.
Nowadays, Islamic financial institutions operate worldwide
(Imam & Kpodar, 2013). Being different from conventional
finance, Islamic finance and the activities of Islamic financial
institutions must be based on Shari'a Law. This is why the
legal environment, on which Islamic financial institutions
operate, can have a direct effect on the Islamic finance
industry's level of development.
The worldwide different stages of development of Islamic
finance drew our attention to investigating the legal origin's
effect on Islamic financial development. In fact, a legal envi-
ronment, which accommodates effectively the intricacies of
the Islamic financial industry and facilitates its development,
is crucial not only in taking the industry forward but, also,
more importantly in ensuring its soundness and stability.
This paper attempts to study empirically the theory of law
and finance in the Islamic finance context. More particularly,
this research attempted to assess empirically why and how
differences in legal system could influence the stage of
development of Islamic finance. We based this study not only
on making comparisons between the effects of Common and
Civil Law but, also, we extended our investigation on how the
origins of Shari'a legal system, adopted wholly or combined
with other legal origins (specially the Civil Law and Common
Law), affected the development of the Islamic finance in the
concerned jurisdictions.
In order to evaluate empirically the Law and theory of
financial development in the context of Islamic finance, we
used cross-country regression on a sample of 30 countries.
Whilst controlling for other possible determinants, we exam-
ined whether cross-country differences in Islamic financial
institutions accounted for cross-country differences in legal
traditions. In order to measure Islamic financial development,
we used the following measures: (i) Islamic banking assets/
GPD; and (ii) Islamic banking assets/total banking assets. We
measured Islamic financial development over the period from
2005 to 2010. In order to measure legal origin, we used data
from the CIA Factbook specifying whether the country had
Common Law/Civil Law/Shari'a Law/combined Shari'a Law/
Civil Law or combined Shari'a Law/Common Law.
In conducting the cross-country comparison, we controlled
for other potential determinants of Islamic financial develop-
ment. Specifically, we included measures of religious
composition, ethnic diversity and the year of independence
since 1776.
We found that: firstly, Shari'a Law had a positive and a sig-
nificant effect on Islamic banking development. Since the evi-
dence was of countries adopting a legal system based on Shari'a
Law and not influenced by western countries, the legal tradition
(Common Law and Civil Law) might have little impact because
of institutional hysteresis. Hence, the Islamic culture could be a
powerful force leading to institutional changes in and, conse-
quently, the development of Islamic finance in these countries.
Secondly, we found that mixed Civil Law/Shari'a Law had
a negative effect on the development of Islamic bankingdevelopment. This outcome could be explained by the fact that
Civil Law affected adversely the positive effect of Shari'a Law
on Islamic banking development. In other words, countries,
adopting a mixed legal system based on both Civil Law and
Shari'a Law, were less flexible in making changes to their laws
and in replacing old laws with new more flexible laws which
met the contractual needs of Islamic finance and which pro-
moted the development of the Islamic financial industry.
Thirdly, we found that countries, adopting a mixed legal
system based on Common Law and Shari'a Law, were char-
acterized by the flexibility of their legal system to make
changes to their evolving laws in response to the changing
socioeconomic conditions which helped the development of
the Islamic financial industry.
Fourthly, we found that countries, adopting a combined
legal system based on Civil Law/Common Law, had a less
developed Islamic financial industry than other jurisdictions
Also, these countries had weak infrastructures for Islamic
financial systems.
Fifthly, we found that the concentration of the Muslim
population (the percentage of Muslim population) had a pos-
itive effect on the development of Islamic banking. In addi-
tion, the level of income had a positive and a significant effect
on the development of Islamic banking. Hence, rising income
per capita tended to increase the number of Islamic banks in a
country.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.
Firstly, this is the first study trying to assess empirically how
different legal origins impact on the development of Islamic
finance, an area which continues to lag behind in the Islamic
finance literature. Secondly, this paper goes much further by
investigating how legal traditions shaped Islamic financial
development, We did so by evaluating the robustness of the
law and finance view by controlling for religion; ethnic di-
versity; and length of independence. This assessment seemed
to be critical if we placed too much confidence in the theory of
law and finance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
literature review on law and finance and how Shari'a Law
mattered to the development of the Islamic finance industry.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 dis-
cusses the descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the
regression results. Section 6 details our conclusion.
2. Literature review
Over the last decade, we observed the emergence of a large
body of research discussing the legal origin's role of on
financial development and how, in changing conditions, the
adaptability of the legal system could explain the financial
development. Adaptability of law means the aptitude of a legal
system to change its way in satisfying the contracting needs of
the new economic conditions which support the development
of the financial system (Ahmed, 2006).
The law and finance theory argues that, over time, different
countries' legal origins had influenced the evolution of their
legal systems; this became a crucial determinant in analyzing
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financial development was observed as a main driving force of
economic growth (Graff, 2006). Hence, the legal system was
recognized as one principal determinant of economic devel-
opment. Accordingly, the causal chain proposed by this law
and finance theory is:
Legal origin / Legal system / financial
development/ economic growth.
Many researches attempted to assess empirically the link
between the legal origin and financial development. Levine
(1998, 1999) explained the effect of legal origin on financial
development through economic growth in the long-run and
suggested that legal origin impacted on the national financial
systems which influenced the economic growth. Moreover, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, hence-
forth LLSV) demonstrated that whether a country commer-
cial's law had British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal
origins was critical to explaining the country's laws on creditor
rights, shareholder rights, and private property rights. These
explained the country's level of bank and stock market
development.
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2004) argued that one
of the important factors, which could explain the development
of the financial sector, was the legal system and the adapt-
ability of laws to evolve following the emergence of new
circumstances. Adaptability concerns the ‘process of law
making’ and implies the ability of the laws to evolve in
response to the changing socioeconomic conditions (Beck
et al., 2004). Nevertheless, making changes to laws is usu-
ally slow and costly and results in the gap between an
economy's financial needs and the assurance of efficient
financing and financial development.
Moreover, Beck and Levine (2003) showed that cross-
country differences in legal origin could explain cross-country
differences in financial development. They clarified how the
theory of law and finance could explain why: “some countries
have well-developed growth-enhancing financial systems,
while others do not”, and why “some countries developed the
necessary investor protection laws and contract-enforcement
mechanisms to support financial institutions and markets,
while others have not”. According to them, the laws' ability to
change depended on the legal origin of each country's legal
system. Also, it depended on the flexibility of the legal system
to accept, through litigation and jurisprudence, the replace-
ment of an inefficient law by an efficient law.
North and Weingast (1989) argued that Britain institutions
were better than France institutions. Hence, British colonies
were expected to have better institutions than French colonies;
this could affect the financial development of these previous
colonies. Hence, legal origin can be a proxy for institutions
and can be related to the legal system. In addition, Stulz and
Williamson (2003) explained that legal origin could be prox-
ies for religious and cultural differences which influenced
financial development and differences in legal tradition. Per
se, these did not help to explain the countries' levels of
financial development. On the other hand, Beck et al. (2003)
showed that, when controlling religious composition andother national characteristics. Legal origin was linked to
financial development.
La Porta (1997) argued that legal systems, based on Common
Law, seemed to be more flexible in evolving and responding to
changing financial conditions because, from time to time, rules
could be replaced by new rules according to the doctrine of stare
decisis. This change could not happen easily when the law was
based on statutes and codes promulgated by the legislature under
the Civil Law system in which laws and statutes could be
adjusted only by the legislature, imposed on courts and intro-
duced by a procedural formalism. Hence, in civil legal systems,
the change of statutory law would be slow and costly.2.1. How Shari'a legal origin can matter for Islamic
finance development?The issue of the flexibility of the legal system and the
adaptability of the law to changing circumstances is crucial to
the development of the Islamic financial system. The questions
relating to dynamism, legal formalism, and the efficiency with
which laws can adapt to changing circumstances is a crucial
factor determining the level of Islamic financial sectors'
development and growth (Ahmed, 2006).
After colonization, most Muslim countries adopted the
legal systems of the colonizing countries (Common Law or
Civil Law) whilst keeping some legislative instructions from
the Shari'a Law. Generally, these adopted legal systems do not
reflect the Islamic culture and the Islamic ideology. That is
why, for a long time, the lack of strong legal infrastructure
institutions in Muslim countries was considered to be a huge
challenge for the development and the growth of Islamic
finance.
In fact, from the beginning of Islamic finance, Islamic
financial contracts were used; however, this was being done in
an unfamiliar legal environment. Even if there was a general
agreement to use Islamic contracts, the laws and courts might
not be there to interpret and impose the form of these contracts
(Ahmed, 2006). The development of Islamic finance along
with contemporary financial transactions requires strong sup-
port from the legal system.
3. Data and methodology3.1. DataIn this study, we used cross-country analyses to assess the
empirical validity of the Origin Law and the growth of Islamic
finance. We started with a first sample of 40 countries with
different legal origins: Civil Law; Common Law; Shari'a Law;
mixed Civil Law/Shari'a Law; mixed Common Law/Shari'a
Law; and mixed Shari'a Law/Civil Law/Common Law origins
(see Table 1). Due to data limitations on the growth of Islamic
finance, we reduced the sample to 30 countries in some of the
regression.
In order to assess the impact of the legal origin on the
financial development, we needed indicators of financial
Table 1
Countries characteristics.
Country Primary language Primary religion Muslim Others Legal origin
Algeria Arabic Islam 0.99 0.01 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Bahrain Arabic Islam 0.82 0.18 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Egypt Arabic Islam 0.9 0.1 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Iran Persian Islam 0.98 0.02 Shari'a Law
Jordan Arabic Islam 0.92 0.08 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Kuwait Arabic Islam 0.85 0.15 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Morocco Arabic Islam 0.99 0.01 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Qatar Arabic Islam 0.775 0.099 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Saudi Arabia Arabic Islam 1 0 Shari'a Law
Syrian Arabic Islam 0.74 0.26 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Tunisia Arabic Islam 0.98 0.02 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
UAE Arabic Islam 0.96 0.04 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Yemen Arabic Islam 0.99 0.01 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Brunei Malay Islam 0.67 0.33 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Indonesia Bahasa Islam 0.86 0.109 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Iraq Arabic Islam 0.97 0.03 Mixed Civil Law/Islamic Law
Kazakhstan Kazakh Islam 0.47 0.43 Civil Law
Malaysia Bahasa Islam 0.604 0.395 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Pakistan Urdu Islam 0.95 0.05 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
South Africa Many languages Christian 0.015 0.985 Mixed Common Law/Civil Law
Sri Lanka Sinhala Buddhist 0.067 0.924 Mixed Common Law/Civil Law
Sudan Arabic Islam 0.99 0.01 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Tanzania Kiswahili or Swahili 0.35 0.65 Common Law
Thailand Thai Buddhist 0.046 0.954 Civil Law
Turkey Turkish Islam 0.998 0.02 Civil Law
UK English Christian 0.027 0.966 Common Law
Bangladesh Bangla Islam 0.89 0.11 Mixed Common Law/Islamic Law
Lebanon Arabic Muslim 0.6 0.4 Mixed Civil Law/Religious Law
The primary language, primary religion, and the origin of the legal system for each country in the sample.
The primary religion (language) of country is religion practiced (language spoken) by the largest fraction of the population. The data on religion and language are
obtained from 2011 CIAWorld Factbook. The percentage values for religion are from Pew Research Center (2011). Data from “The Future of the global Muslim
population” (2011), Pew Research center. The Legal Origin variables are obtained from CIA World Factbook (2011).
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development of Islamic banking. (Table 2)
3.1.1. Financial development
In order to measure financial development, we used in-
dicators of financial intermediary development. The objective
of this paper is to proxy for the degree of national financial
system to facilitate the development of the Islamic financial
industry and to help to mobilize saving effectively in this in-
dustry. Because we did not have a direct measure to allow us to
compare the ability of national financial systems to help the
broad cross-section of countries to have these benefits, we
used a variety of indicators of financial growth to assess the
relationships between law and the development and the
worldwide growth of Islamic finance.
ISLAMIC FINANCE GROWTH equaled Islamic finan-
cial assets (financial intermediary credit to the private sector)
divided by Gross Domestic product (GDP) and measured over
the period from 2005 to 2010. For most countries, this variable
was unavailable. That is why we used hand collected data for
this variable.
ISLAMIC FINANCE CONCENTRATION equaled Is-
lamic banking assets divided by the total banking assets and
averaged, also, over the period from 2005 to 2010. For our
study of most countries, we hand collected this data.3.1.2. Legal origin
In our analysis, we considered six legal families. Firstly, we
considered the traditional families defined by La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998). In fact, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) classified
the countries' legal origins in Common Law derived from
British origin and Civil Law derived from French, German or
Scandinavian countries. (i) The CIVIL LAW dummy variable
equaled one if the country adopted its company/commercial
law from the French, German or Scandinavian Civil Law and
zero otherwise. (ii) The COMMON LAW dummy variable
equaled one if the country adopted its company/commercial
law from the British Common Law and zero otherwise.
Besides, and as an extension to La Porta et al.'s (1998,
1999) study, we used other data from the CIA FACTBOOK.
(iii) The SHARI'A LAW dummy variable equaled one if the
country adopted a pure Law from the Shari'a Law and zero
otherwise. (iv)The MIXED CIVIL LAW/SHARI'A LAW
dummy variable equaled one if the country adopted a mixed
Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero
otherwise. (v)The MIXED COMMON LAW/SHARIA
LAW dummy variable equaled one if the country adopted a
mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and
zero otherwise. (vi) CIVIL LAW/COMMON LAW, dummy
variable equaled one if the country adopted Civil and Common
Laws together and zero otherwise.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable OBS Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Islamic finance growth 119 0.19 0.26 0.00002 1.32
Islamic finance concentration 108 0.20 0.30 0.0007 1
Shari'a Law 164 0.07 0.26 0 1
Civil Law 164 0.10 0.30 0 1
Common Law 158 0.10 0.31 0 1
Civil Law/Shari'a Law 164 0.35 0.48 0 1
Common Law/Shari'a Law 164 0.26 0.44 0 1
Civil Law/Common Law 164 0.03 0.18 0 1
Income level 152 3.47 0.56 2.57 4.52
Religion (Islam) 154 0.85 0.34 0 1
Ethnic 157 0.34 0.24 0.019 0.74
Independence 153 0.189 0.39 0 1
Islamic Finance Growth: equals Islamic financial assets divided by Gross
Domestic product (GDP), Islamic Finance Concentration: equals to Islamic
banking assets divided by total banking assets, CIVIL LAW: dummy variable
equals one if the country adopted its company/commercial law from the
French, German or Scandinavian Civil Law and zero otherwise; COMMON
LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted its company/com-
mercial law from the British Common Law and zero otherwise; SHARI'A
LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a pure Law from the
Shari'a Law and zero otherwise, MIXED CIVIL LAW/SHARI'A LAW:
dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a mixed Law from the
French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero otherwise; MIXED COMMON
LAW/SHARIA LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a
mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero otherwise;
CIVIL LAW/COMMON LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country
adopted Civil and Common Laws together and zero otherwise; INCOME
LEVEL: the logarithm of the real GDP per capita in US dollars; RELIGION:
dummy variable equals one if the country's primary religion is Islam and zero
otherwise; ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION: it measures the probability
that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to
the some ethnic group; INDEPENDENCE: equals the fraction of years since
1776 that a country has been independent.
1 The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for
Islamic Countries (SESRIC), was founded as a subsidiary organ of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Centre started its activities in
Ankara on 1 June 1978. The mains purpose of SESRIC are threefold: (i)
collate, process and disseminate socio-economic statistics and information on
and for the utilization of the member countries, (ii) study and evaluate the
economic and social developments in the member countries to help generate
proposals that will initiate and enhance co-operation among them, and (iii)
organize training programmes in selected fields geared to the needs of the
member countries as well as to the general objectives of the OIC.
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Islamic banking
In order to assess the robustness of our results,we included, in
our empirical analysis, several other potential determinants of
Islamic financial development. (i) INCOME LEVEL, we
found that Real income was correlated greatly with the devel-
opment of Islamic banking. We used the logarithm of the real
GDP per capita in US dollars to measure the income level. (ii)
RELIGION dummy variable equaled one if Islam was the
country's primary religion and zero otherwise. In fact, the higher
the country's percentage of Muslims there was faster develop-
ment of Islamic banks. (iii) ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZA-
TION is an indicator of ethnic diversity, it measures the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given
country will not belong to the some ethnic group. La Porta et al.
(1999) argued that ethnic diversity led to corruption and low
efficiency in governments that expropriated the ethnic losers.
When we applied this view to the financial sector, the implica-
tion was that greater ethnic diversity implied the adoption of
policies and institutions focused on maintaining power and
control, rather than on creating an open and competitive finan-
cial system, (iv) INDEPENDENCE equaled the fraction of
years since 1776 that a country was independent. We included
this variable since a longer period of independence mightprovide greater opportunities for countries to develop in-
stitutions, policies, and regulations independent of their colonial
heritage.3.2. Econometric methodologyWe used the following to estimate the model:
Yi ¼ ai þ b1Xiþ b2Zi þ mi For i¼ 1;2; :::N
where we defined Yi , the dependent variable, by referring to: (i)
Islamic assets to total assets ratio and (ii) Islamic assets to GDP
ratio Xi was a matrix of legal origin variables made up of Shari'a
Law, Civil Law, Common Law, Civil Law/Shari'a Law, Common
Law/Shari'a Law, Civil Law/Common Law. Zi was a matrix of
control variables (INCOME LEVEL, RELIGION, ETHNIC
FRACTIONALIZATION, and INDEPENDENECE). ai was the
unobserved country specific fixed effect, andmiwas the error term
for each observation.We estimated regressions by usingOrdinary
Least Squares (OLS).
4. Descriptive statistics4.1. The worldwide development of the Islamic financeOver the last decade, Islamic finance has known a strong
growth and an increasing presence worldwide. Nowadays, Is-
lamic finance is emerging worldwide as an alternative source of
finance. By the end of 2011, the global market for Islamic
financial services was estimated to be USD 1.1 Trillion (The
Banker Survey, 2010).
Islamic finance is more developed in countries characterized
by the large presence ofMuslim populations. In fact, as at the end
of 2011, the Islamic financial assets in OIC countries was esti-
mated to be around 98% of global Shari'a assets and the MENA
region held the greatest part of this share, around 79%. The GCC
countries accounted formore than 40%of totalShari'a assetswith,
since 2006, an average compounded growth rate of 27.7%.On the
other hand; evenwith the large presence ofMuslim populations in
Asian countries, Islamic finance was underrepresented greatly in
the region and accounted for a small share of around 15% of the
Islamic financial market. This indicated the need to develop the
Islamic financial industry and the great potential to develop this
industry in the region (SESRIC, 2012)1.
Moreover, the share of Islamic finance assets in non-
Muslim regions such as Australia, Europe and America did
not exceed 2% in the global Islamic financial market. Despite
0
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Fig. 1. Average Islamic assets/Total bank assets for the period 2005e2010.
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finance. According to the SESRIC (2012) the average growth
of Islamic financial assets in these regions is 21.6% and more
than doubled during the period from 2006 to 2011, indicating
the huge potential to develop Islamic finance in these regions.
Nowadays, Sub-Saharan Africa countries (SSA) such as
Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania have taken their first steps
to develop an internal Islamic financial market; this represents
an interesting source of funding for large scale infrastructure
development projects (SESRIC, 2012).4.2. The growth and legal origin of Islamic financeFigs. 1 and 2 show clearly that, compared to countries with
a French Civil Law origin or mixed Shari'a/Civil Law, Islamic
financial growth is substantially higher in countries with a
Shariah Law tradition and mixed Common/Shariah Law
origin. When compared to Shari'a Law countries or mixed
Shariah Law/Common Law countries, Civil Law countries and
mixed Civil Law/Shari'a Law countries have, on average, a
lower level of Islamic assets/GDP ratio and Islamic assets
concentrations. Table 3, the correlations matrix, confirms Figs.
1 and 2 that there is a significant negative correlation between
French Legal Law and mixed Shari'a Law/Civil Law dummy
variables and Islamic financial growth.
5. Results
This section presents the results from regressions to assess
the importance of legal families in explaining cross-country
variances in Islamic financial development.0
0.05
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Law/Shari'a law
mixed Civil Law/
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Fig. 2. Average Islamic assets/GDP ratio for the period 2005e2010.Table 4 shows how the Islamic Assets to GDP ratio differ
according to legal families. In the first column of Table 4, we
present the results when we introduced Shari'a Law as an in-
dicator of legal families. Our findings confirmed the theoret-
ical expectations. In fact, Shari'a Law had a positive and a
significant effect on the development of Islamic banking. This
outcome can be explained by the fact that Shari'a Law is the
principle source of Islamic finance and, hence, governments,
adopting Shari'a legal system, are more interested in devel-
oping the Islamic finance industry.
In order to investigate the effect of the traditional legal
families on Islamic banking, we introduced the Civil Law and
Common Law variables respectively in the second and third
columns of Table 4. As with the conventional banking, the
results indicated that, whilst there was a strong negative
relationship between civil legal origin and Islamic banking
development, the Common Law variable had a positive and a
significant effect on the development of Islamic banking.
These outcomes were consistent with the LLSV (1998) view
that countries, where legal rules originated in the Common-
Law tradition, tended to protect investors considerably better
than the Civil Law countries and, especially, in those countries
with the French Civil Law tradition. Law enforcement was
strong, also, in Common Law countries whereas it was at its
weakest in the French Civil Law countries. Therefore, on
average, the civil legal origin countries, had a substantially
lower level of financial development than found in the Com-
mon Law countries.
We based our study not only on making comparisons be-
tween the effect of Common, Civil and Shari'a Law but, also,
we extended our investigation on how mixed law (Civil Law/
Islamic Law, Common Law/Islamic Law, Civil Law/Common
Law) could affect the development of Islamic finance in these
jurisdictions. Therefore, in the column (4) of Table 4 we
introduced our first mixed legal family which was Civil Law/
Shari'a Law. The results indicated that Civil Law/Shari'a Law
had a negative effect on the development of Islamic banking.
This outcome could be explained by the fact that Civil Law
affected adversely the positive effect of Shari'a Law on the
development of Islamic banking. In column (5), we introduced
the Common Law/Shari'a Law as an indicator of mixed legal
families. Our findings showed that whilst the Common Law/
Shari'a Law did not appear to be a significant determinant the
Islamic Assets to GDP ratio, the positive sign confirmed the
theoretical expectation that Common Law affected favorably
the positive effect of Shari'a Law on the development of Is-
lamic banking.
Finally, in column (6), we introduced the mixed Civil
Law/Common Law variable. Our findings indicated that the
Civil Law/Common Law variable had a strong negative ef-
fect on the development of Islamic banking. In countries
with mixed law (Civil Law/Common Law), this result indi-
cated that, as regards the development of Islamic banking,
the negative effect of Civil Law dominated over the positive
effect of Common Law. In fact, Civil Law hampered the
positive effect of Common Law on the development of Is-
lamic banking.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
Islamic
finance
growth
Islamic
finance
concentration
Shari'a
Law
Civil
Law
Common
Law
Civil Law/
Shari'a Law
Common
Law/Shari'a
Law
Civil Law/
Common
Law
Income
level
Religion
(Islam)
Ethnic Independence
Islamic Finance Growth 1
Islamic Finance
Concentration
0.38a 1
Shari'a Law 0.30a 0.56a 1
Civil Law 0.21a 0.19a 0.09a 1
Common Law 0.01a 0.50a 0.09 0.12a 1
Civil Law/Shari'a Law 0.31a 0.43a 0.21a 0.25a 0.24a 1
Common Law/Shari'a Law 0.40a 0.03 0.16a 0.20a 0.21a 0.44a 1
Civil Law/Common Law 0.16a 0.01a 0.05 0.06 0.06a 0.14a 0.11 1
Income Level 0.30a 0.07 0.09 0.14a 0.01 0.28a 0.42a 0.03 1
Religion (Islam) 0.20a 0.22a 0.11a 0.49a 0.20a 0.08 0.24a 0.07a 0.01 1
Ethnic 0.25a 0.23a 0.04a 0.05a 0.063a 0.49a 0.55a 0.007a 0.35a 0.04a 1
Independence 0.12 0.19a 0.23a 0.41a 0.14a 0.35a 0.04a 0.09a 0.30a 0.30a 0.24a 1
Islamic Finance Growth: equals Islamic financial assets divided by Gross Domestic product (GDP), Islamic Finance Concentration: equals to Islamic banking
assets divided by total banking assets, CIVIL LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted its company/commercial law from the French, German or
Scandinavian Civil Law and zero otherwise; COMMON LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted its company/commercial law from the British
Common Law and zero otherwise; SHARI'A LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a pure Law from the Shari'a Law and zero otherwise,
MIXED CIVIL LAW/SHARI'A LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero
otherwise; MIXED COMMON LAW/SHARIA LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a
Law and zero otherwise; CIVIL LAW/COMMON LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted Civil and Common Laws together and zero
otherwise; INCOME LEVEL: the logarithm of the real GDP per capita in US dollars; RELIGION: dummy variable equals one if the country's primary religion is
Islam and zero otherwise; ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION: it measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not
belong to the some ethnic group; INDEPENDENCE: equals the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent.
a significant at 10%.
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Islamic assets to total assets ratio to be an indicator of the
development of Islamic banking. Table 5 presents the results
of estimation using Islamic assets to total assets as the
dependent variable. In terms of significance the six legal
families display qualitatively the same results as those of the
regressions with Islamic assets to GDP ratio. In fact, whilst
Shari'a Law, Common Law and mixed Shari'a Law/Common
Law had a strong positive effect on Islamic assets to total
assets ratio, Civil Law and both the mixed Civil Law/Shari'a
Law, Civil Law/Common Law had a negative effect on the
Islamic assets to total assets ratio.
Looking to our control variables our mains findings showed
that the variable, Islam, had a positive and significant effect on
the development of Islamic banking as did the level of income.
As with conventional banking, increasing income per capita
tended to increase the number of Islamic banks in a country.
We found the effects of Ethnic fractionalization and inde-
pendence to be ambiguous. In fact, in some regressions, whilst
they appeared to have a positive and a significant effect on the
development of Islamic banking, they had, in other re-
gressions, a significantly negative effect on Islamic banking.
6. Conclusion
This paper assessed the theory of finance regarding the
historical determinants of financial development in the context
of Islamic finance. According to Beck et al. (2003) “The law
and financial theory argue that historically determined differ-
ences in legal origin can explain cross-country differences infinancial development observed today. Specially, the Law and
finance theory predicts that countries that inherited the British
common law tradition obtained a legal tradition that tends to
support financial development to a much greater degree than
countries that obtained the French civil law tradition”. In this
paper, we tried to study the impact of the Shari'a Law adopted
wholly as a legal system or partially (combined with Common
or Civil Law) on the development of the Islamic financial
industry.
Using a cross-country analysis for 30 countries observed
over the period from 2005 to 2010, our research revealed
several findings. Firstly, we found that Shari'a Law had a
positive and a significant effect on the growth of Islamic
banking since there was evidence that countries, like Iran,
adopting a legal system based on Shari'a Law and not influ-
enced by western legal traditions (Common Law and Civil
Law), might have little impact because of institutional hys-
teresis. Hence, Islamic culture can be powerful force which
leads to changes in institutions and, consequently, the devel-
opment of Islamic finance in these countries.
Secondly, we found that mixed Civil Law/Shari'a Law has a
negative effect on Islamic banking growth. This outcome
could be explained by the fact that Civil Law affected
adversely the positive effect of Shari'a Law on the develop-
ment of Islamic banking. In other words, countries, adopting a
mixed legal system based on both Civil Law and Shari'a Law,
are less flexible in making changes in their laws and to
replacing old laws with new more flexible laws associated
with the contractual need of Islamic finance which promotes
the development of the Islamic financial industry.
Table 5
Legal families and Islamic banking Growth.
Y ¼ Islamic assets to total assets ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shari'a Law 0.65*
(9.87)
Civil Law 0.16**
(2.55)
Common Law 0.16**
(2.55)
Civil Law/Shari'a Law 0.34*
(4.44)
Common Law/Shari'a Law 0.20**
(2.08)
Civil Law/Common Law 0.02
(0.50)
Income Level 0.03
(0.67)
0.10
(1.42)
0.10
(1.42)
0.19**
(2.55)
0.06
(0.89)
0.12
(1.58)
Religion (Islam) 0.13*
(6.23)
0.23*
(4.44)
0.23*
(4.44)
0.19*
(2.84)
0.34*
(5.17)
0.28*
(5.35)
Ethnic 0.32*
(5.31)
0.32*
(2.95)
0.32*
(2.95)
0.03
(0.35)
0.56*
(3.56)
0.34*
(3.13)
Independence 0.01
(0.24)
0.22*
(2.35)
0.22*
(2.35)
0.008
(0.07)
0.10
(1.21)
0.16
(1.65)
Cst 0.05
(0.4)
0.25
(1.11)
0.25
(1.11)
0.87*
(2.86)
0.09
(0.40)
0.18
(0.82)
R2 0.73 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.28
T-statistics for the coefficient are in parenthesis.
* significant at 1%,** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10%.
Islamic Finance Growth: equals Islamic financial assets divided by Gross
Domestic product (GDP), Islamic Finance Concentration: equals to Is-
lamic banking assets divided by total banking assets, CIVIL LAW: dummy
variable equals one if the country adopted its company/commercial law
from the French, German or Scandinavian Civil Law and zero otherwise;
COMMON LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted its
company/commercial law from the British Common Law and zero other-
wise; SHARI'A LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a
pure Law from the Shari'a Law and zero otherwise, MIXED CIVIL LAW/
SHARI'A LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a mixed
Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero otherwise;
MIXED COMMON LAW/SHARIA LAW: dummy variable equals one if
the country adopted a mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a
Law and zero otherwise; CIVIL LAW/COMMON LAW: dummy variable
equals one if the country adopted Civil and Common Laws together and
zero otherwise; INCOME LEVEL: the logarithm of the real GDP per
capita in US dollars; RELIGION: dummy variable equals one if the
country's primary religion is Islam and zero otherwise; ETHNIC FRAC-
TIONALIZATION: it measures the probability that two randomly selected
individuals from a given country will not belong to the some ethnic group;
INDEPENDENCE: equals the fraction of years since 1776 that a country
has been independent.
Table 4
Legal families and Islamic banking development.
Variables Y ¼ Islamic assets to GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shari'a Law 0.33*
(11.76)
Civil Law 0.14*
(2.77)
Common Law 0.14*
(2.77)
Civil
Law/Shari'a
Law
0.26*
(3.67)
Common
Law/Shari'a
Law
0.06
(0.57)
Civil
Law/Common
Law
0.22*
(8.66)
Income Level 0.17*
(3.96)
0.12*
(2.71)
0.12*
(2.71)
0.07***
(1.77)
0.11***
(1.86)
0.13*
(2.67)
Religion (Islam) 0.03
(0.86)
0.19*
(3.13)
0.19*
(3.13)
0.20*
(4.17)
0.13**
(2.61)
0.14*
(3.01)
Ethnic 0.23*
(3.92)
0.21*
(2.80)
0.21*
(2.80)
0.09
(0.90)
0.14
(0.92)
0.21*
(2.66)
Independence 0.26*
(4.04)
0.08
(1.12)
0.08
(1.12)
0.20**
(2.51)
0.13
(1.39)
0.16***
(1.97)
Cst 0.48*
(3.54)
0.40**
(2.47)
0.40**
(2.47)
0.04
(0.29)
0.34
(1.62)
0.41**
(2.49)
R2 0.37 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.23
T-statistics for the coefficient are in parenthesis.
* significant at 1%,** significant at 5% and*** significant at 10%.
Islamic Finance Growth: equals Islamic financial assets divided by Gross
Domestic product (GDP), Islamic Finance Concentration: equals to Islamic
banking assets divided by total banking assets, CIVIL LAW: dummy variable
equals one if the country adopted its company/commercial law from the
French, German or Scandinavian Civil Law and zero otherwise; COMMON
LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted its company/com-
mercial law from the British Common Law and zero otherwise; SHARI'A
LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a pure Law from the
Shari'a Law and zero otherwise, MIXED CIVIL LAW/SHARI'A LAW:
dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a mixed Law from the
French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero otherwise; MIXED COMMON
LAW/SHARIA LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country adopted a
mixed Law from the French Civil Law and Shari'a Law and zero otherwise;
CIVIL LAW/COMMON LAW: dummy variable equals one if the country
adopted Civil and Common Laws together and zero otherwise; INCOME
LEVEL: the logarithm of the real GDP per capita in US dollars; RELIGION:
dummy variable equals one if the country's primary religion is Islam and zero
otherwise; ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION: it measures the probability
that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to
the some ethnic group; INDEPENDENCE: equals the fraction of years since
1776 that a country has been independent.
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appear to be a significant determinant on the growth of Islamic
finance; the positive sign confirmed the theoretical expectation
that Common Law affected favorably the positive effect of
Shari'a Law on the development of Islamic banking. Hence,
countries, adopting a mixed legal system based on Common
Law and Shari'a Law, were characterized by the flexibility of
their legal system to make changes in their laws in response to
the changing socioeconomic conditions and, therefore to
develop the Islamic financial industry.Fourthly, we found that countries, adopting a combined
legal system based on Civil Law/Common Law, had an un-
developed Islamic financial industry characterized by a weak
infrastructure for the Islamic financial system.
Fifthly, we found that the concentration of Muslim popu-
lation (the percentage of Muslim population) had a positive
effect on the development of Islamic banking. In addition, the
level of income had a positive and a significant effect on its
development. As with conventional banking, increasing in-
come per capita tended to increase the number of Islamic
banks in a country.
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